[packages/openssh] do not lower ssh client security by default

gotar gotar at pld-linux.org
Tue Aug 23 08:04:13 CEST 2016


commit ae957f1bc3196e53edce28c17e1f35232638e733
Author: Tomasz Pala <gotar at pld-linux.org>
Date:   Tue Aug 23 07:59:32 2016 +0200

    do not lower ssh client security by default
    
    ForwardX11Trusted might be enabled on command line by using -Y instead
    of -X, so there's no real need for doing it system-wide(!) default.
    Moreover, the rationale behind trusting remote party might be obsolete:
    http://dailypackage.fedorabook.com/index.php?/archives/48-Wednesday-Why-Trusted-and-Untrusted-X11-Forwarding-with-SSH.html
    Either way, trusting some potentially malicious (especially without
    StrictHostKeyChecking) )remote side MUST be conscious decision.

 openssh-config.patch | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/openssh-config.patch b/openssh-config.patch
index 4d35a03..4bc53c3 100644
--- a/openssh-config.patch
+++ b/openssh-config.patch
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
  #   BatchMode no
  #   CheckHostIP yes
  #   AddressFamily any
-@@ -42,3 +45,19 @@
+@@ -42,3 +45,18 @@
  #   VisualHostKey no
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
  #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
@@ -89,10 +89,9 @@
 +Host *
 +	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+	StrictHostKeyChecking no
++# to the original X11 server. As some X11 clients don't support the untrusted
++# mode correctly, you might consider changing this to 'yes' or using '-Y'.
++#	ForwardX11Trusted no
 +	ServerAliveInterval 60
 +	ServerAliveCountMax 10
 +	TCPKeepAlive no
================================================================

---- gitweb:

http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/openssh.git/commitdiff/ae957f1bc3196e53edce28c17e1f35232638e733



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