[packages/openssh] - up to 6.2p1
arekm
arekm at pld-linux.org
Sat Mar 23 09:24:35 CET 2013
commit ec3e8a5a27586c01a9ab1c4bde5fc4b663ef8805
Author: Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz <arekm at maven.pl>
Date: Sat Mar 23 09:24:32 2013 +0100
- up to 6.2p1
authorized-keys-command.patch | 441 ------------------------------------------
openssh-blacklist.diff | 20 +-
openssh.spec | 17 +-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 459 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index d7661d0..86381d6 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -34,13 +34,13 @@ Summary(pt_BR.UTF-8): Implementação livre do SSH
Summary(ru.UTF-8): OpenSSH - свободная реализация протокола Secure Shell (SSH)
Summary(uk.UTF-8): OpenSSH - вільна реалізація протоколу Secure Shell (SSH)
Name: openssh
-Version: 6.1p1
-Release: 2
+Version: 6.2p1
+Release: 1
Epoch: 2
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Networking
Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
-# Source0-md5: 3345cbf4efe90ffb06a78670ab2d05d5
+# Source0-md5: 7b2d9dd75b5cf267ea1737ec75500316
Source1: http://www.mif.pg.gda.pl/homepages/ankry/man-PLD/%{name}-non-english-man-pages.tar.bz2
# Source1-md5: 66943d481cc422512b537bcc2c7400d1
Source2: %{name}d.init
@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ Patch4: %{name}-5.9p1-ldap.patch
Patch5: %{name}-5.9p1-ldap-fixes.patch
Patch8: ldap.conf.patch
Patch6: %{name}-config.patch
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1663
-Patch7: authorized-keys-command.patch
+
# High Performance SSH/SCP - HPN-SSH - http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/
# http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/openssh-5.2p1-hpn13v6.diff.gz
Patch9: %{name}-5.2p1-hpn13v6.diff
@@ -534,7 +533,7 @@ openldap-a.
%patch5 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%patch6 -p1
-%patch7 -p1
+
%{?with_hpn:%patch9 -p1}
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
@@ -574,9 +573,9 @@ CPPFLAGS="-DCHROOT"
--with-mantype=man \
--with-md5-passwords \
--with-pam \
- --with-authorized-keys-command \
--with-pid-dir=%{_localstatedir}/run \
--with-privsep-path=%{_privsepdir} \
+ --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
%{?with_selinux:--with-selinux} \
--with-tcp-wrappers \
%if "%{pld_release}" == "ac"
@@ -705,6 +704,10 @@ if [ "$1" = "0" ]; then
fi
%systemd_reload
+%triggerpostun server -- %{name}-server < 6.2p1-1
+cp -f %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config{,.rpmorig}
+sed -i -e 's#AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser##g' %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+
%triggerpostun server -- %{name}-server < 2:5.9p1-8
# lpk.patch to ldap.patch
if grep -qE '^(UseLPK|Lpk)' %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config; then
diff --git a/authorized-keys-command.patch b/authorized-keys-command.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d56398..0000000
--- a/authorized-keys-command.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,441 +0,0 @@
---- openssh-5.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-05-29 13:39:38.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-09-13 01:17:16.352798645 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/wait.h>
-
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-@@ -256,27 +257,15 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
-
- /* return 1 if user allows given key */
- static int
--user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
-+user_search_key_in_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- const char *reason;
- int found_key = 0;
-- FILE *f;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- Key *found;
- char *fp;
-
-- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
--
-- debug("trying public key file %s", file);
-- f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
--
-- if (!f) {
-- restore_uid();
-- return 0;
-- }
--
- found_key = 0;
- found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
-
-@@ -369,8 +358,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
- break;
- }
- }
-- restore_uid();
-- fclose(f);
- key_free(found);
- if (!found_key)
- debug2("key not found");
-@@ -432,13 +419,191 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
- return ret;
- }
-
--/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
-+/* return 1 if user allows given key */
-+static int
-+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
-+{
-+ FILE *f;
-+ int found_key = 0;
-+
-+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+
-+ debug("trying public key file %s", file);
-+ f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
-+
-+ if (f) {
-+ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, file, key, pw);
-+ fclose(f);
-+ }
-+
-+ restore_uid();
-+ return found_key;
-+}
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND
-+
-+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
-+
-+/* return 1 if user allows given key */
-+static int
-+user_key_via_command_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
-+{
-+ FILE *f;
-+ int found_key = 0;
-+ char *progname = NULL;
-+ char *cp;
-+ struct passwd *runas_pw;
-+ struct stat st;
-+ int childdescriptors[2], i;
-+ pid_t pstat, pid, child;
-+
-+ if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL || options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ /* get the run as identity from config */
-+ runas_pw = (options.authorized_keys_command_runas == NULL)? pw
-+ : getpwnam (options.authorized_keys_command_runas);
-+ if (!runas_pw) {
-+ error("%s: getpwnam(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
-+ options.authorized_keys_command_runas, strerror(errno));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Temporarily use the specified uid. */
-+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0)
-+ temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
-+
-+ progname = xstrdup(options.authorized_keys_command);
-+
-+ debug3("%s: checking program '%s'", __func__, progname);
-+
-+ if (stat (progname, &st) < 0) {
-+ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
-+ progname, strerror(errno));
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+ error("bad ownership or modes for AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\"",
-+ progname);
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" is not a regular file",
-+ progname);
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
-+ * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
-+ */
-+ do {
-+ if ((cp = strrchr(progname, '/')) == NULL)
-+ break;
-+ else
-+ *cp = '\0';
-+
-+ debug3("%s: checking component '%s'", __func__, (*progname == '\0' ? "/" : progname));
-+
-+ if (stat((*progname == '\0' ? "/" : progname), &st) != 0) {
-+ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
-+ progname, strerror(errno));
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+ error("bad ownership or modes for AuthorizedKeysCommand path component \"%s\"",
-+ progname);
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand path component \"%s\" is not a directory",
-+ progname);
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+ } while (1);
-+
-+ /* open the pipe and read the keys */
-+ if (pipe(childdescriptors)) {
-+ error("failed to pipe(2) for AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s",
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+
-+ child = fork();
-+ if (child == -1) {
-+ error("failed to fork(2) for AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s",
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ goto go_away;
-+ } else if (child == 0) {
-+ /* we're in the child process here -- we should never return from this block. */
-+ /* permanently drop privs in child process */
-+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0) {
-+ restore_uid();
-+ permanently_set_uid(runas_pw);
-+ }
-+
-+ close(childdescriptors[0]);
-+ /* put the write end of the pipe on stdout (FD 1) */
-+ if (dup2(childdescriptors[1], 1) == -1) {
-+ error("failed to dup2(2) from AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s",
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(127);
-+ }
-+
-+ debug3("about to execl() AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" \"%s\"", options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name);
-+ /* see session.c:child_close_fds() */
-+ for (i = 3; i < 64; ++i) {
-+ close(i);
-+ }
-+
-+ execl(options.authorized_keys_command, options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
-+
-+ /* if we got here, it didn't work */
-+ error("failed to execl AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", strerror(errno)); /* this won't work because we closed the fds above */
-+ _exit(127);
-+ }
-+
-+ close(childdescriptors[1]);
-+ f = fdopen(childdescriptors[0], "r");
-+ if (!f) {
-+ error("%s: could not buffer FDs from AuthorizedKeysCommand (\"%s\", \"r\"): %s", __func__,
-+ options.authorized_keys_command, strerror (errno));
-+ goto go_away;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
-+ fclose (f);
-+ do {
-+ pid = waitpid(child, &pstat, 0);
-+ } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-+
-+ /* what about the return value from the child process? */
-+go_away:
-+ if (progname)
-+ xfree (progname);
-+
-+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0)
-+ restore_uid();
-+ return found_key;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/* check whether given key is in <AuthorizedKeysCommand or .ssh/authorized_keys* */
- int
- user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
- {
- u_int success, i;
- char *file;
-
-+#ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND
-+ success = user_key_via_command_allowed2(pw, key);
-+ if (success > 0)
-+ return success;
-+#endif
-+
- if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
- return 0;
- if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
---- openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac 2011-08-18 06:48:24.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac 2011-09-13 01:17:16.388769789 +0200
-@@ -1421,6 +1421,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
- esac ]
- )
-
-+# Check whether user wants AuthorizedKeysCommand support
-+AKC_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(authorized-keys-command,
-+ [ --with-authorized-keys-command Enable AuthorizedKeysCommand support],
-+ [
-+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND], 1, [Enable AuthorizedKeysCommand support])
-+ AKC_MSG="yes"
-+ fi
-+ ]
-+)
-+
- dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
- arc4random \
-@@ -4235,6 +4247,7 @@ echo " SELinux support
- echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
- echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
- echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
-+echo " AuthorizedKeysCommand support: $AKC_MSG"
- echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
- echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
---- openssh-5.9p1/servconf.c 2011-06-23 00:30:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/servconf.c 2011-09-13 01:18:27.828816240 +0200
-@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
- options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
- options->chroot_directory = NULL;
-+ options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
-+ options->authorized_keys_command_runas = NULL;
- options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
- options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
- options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
-@@ -324,6 +326,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
- sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
-+ sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs,
- sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
-
-@@ -448,6 +451,13 @@ static struct {
- { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+#ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND
-+ { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#else
-+ { "authorizedkeyscommand", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#endif
- { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
-
-@@ -1395,6 +1405,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- }
- break;
-
-+ case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
-+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
-+ if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL)
-+ options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ case sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs:
-+ charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_runas;
-+
-+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
-+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
-+ break;
-+
- case sDeprecated:
- logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
-@@ -1499,6 +1523,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
- M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
-+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command);
-+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_runas);
- M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
- M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
-
-@@ -1758,6 +1784,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- o->authorized_principals_file);
- dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
-+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
-+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, o->authorized_keys_command_runas);
-
- /* string arguments requiring a lookup */
- dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
---- openssh-5.9p1/servconf.h 2011-06-23 00:30:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/servconf.h 2011-09-13 01:17:16.481674272 +0200
-@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ typedef struct {
- char *authorized_principals_file;
-
- char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
-+ char *authorized_keys_command;
-+ char *authorized_keys_command_runas;
- } ServerOptions;
-
- /*
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.0 2011-09-07 01:16:30.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.0 2011-09-13 01:17:16.509816302 +0200
-@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
-
- See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
-
-+ AuthorizedKeysCommand
-+
-+ Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's
-+ public keys. The program will be invoked with its first
-+ argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce
-+ on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS
-+ in sshd(8)). By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no
-+ AuthorizedKeysCommand run. If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
-+ authorize the user, authorization falls through to the
-+ AuthorizedKeysFile. Note that this option has an effect
-+ only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.
-+
-+ AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs
-+ Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-+ Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized
-+ is used.
-+
- AuthorizedKeysFile
- Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
- for user authentication. The format is described in the
-@@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
- Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
- Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
- AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding,
-- AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
-+ AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedKeysCommand,
-+ AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
- ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
- GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,
- HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.5 2011-08-05 22:17:33.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.5 2011-09-13 01:17:16.536674498 +0200
-@@ -706,6 +706,8 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
- .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
- .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
-+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
-+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs ,
- .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
- .Cm Banner ,
- .Cm ChrootDirectory ,
-@@ -718,6 +720,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
-+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
- .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
- .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
- .Cm PermitOpen ,
-@@ -920,6 +923,20 @@ Specifies a list of revoked public keys.
- Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
- Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
- be refused for all users.
-+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-+Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's
-+public keys. The program will be invoked with its first
-+argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce
-+on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS
-+in sshd(8)). By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no
-+AuthorizedKeysCommand run. If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
-+authorize the user, authorization falls through to the
-+AuthorizedKeysFile. Note that this option has an effect
-+only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.
-+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs
-+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. Empty
-+string (the default value) means the user being authorized is used.
-+.Dq
- .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config 2011-05-29 13:39:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config 2011-09-13 01:17:16.555799142 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
- # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
- AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
-
-+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
-+#AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs nobody
-+
- # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
- #RhostsRSAAuthentication no
- # similar for protocol version 2
diff --git a/openssh-blacklist.diff b/openssh-blacklist.diff
index deded70..e1fe04c 100644
--- a/openssh-blacklist.diff
+++ b/openssh-blacklist.diff
@@ -960,27 +960,25 @@ This patch is up to date with respect to Debian openssh 1:4.7p1-10.
#include "auth.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
-@@ -596,9 +596,23 @@
- int
- user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+@@ -608,6 +608,20 @@
{
-+ char *fp;
u_int success, i;
char *file;
-
++ char *fp;
++
+ if (blacklisted_key(key)) {
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (options.permit_blacklisted_keys)
+ logit("Public key %s blacklisted (see "
-+ "ssh-vulnkey(1)); continuing anyway", fp);
++ "ssh-vulnkey(1)); continuing anyway", fp);
+ else
+ logit("Public key %s blacklisted (see "
-+ "ssh-vulnkey(1))", fp);
++ "ssh-vulnkey(1))", fp);
+ xfree(fp);
+ if (!options.permit_blacklisted_keys)
+ return 0;
+ }
-+
- #ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND
- success = user_key_via_command_allowed2(pw, key);
- if (success > 0)
+
+ if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+ return 0;
+
================================================================
---- gitweb:
http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/openssh.git/commitdiff/ec3e8a5a27586c01a9ab1c4bde5fc4b663ef8805
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