[packages/kernel] - builds; imq updated; apparmor updated; zph dropped (unmaintained for few years)
arekm
arekm at pld-linux.org
Fri Jul 29 12:45:50 CEST 2016
commit 0776672ee02c20aad1fc3255f8d47289c503a927
Author: Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz <arekm at maven.pl>
Date: Fri Jul 29 12:45:42 2016 +0200
- builds; imq updated; apparmor updated; zph dropped (unmaintained for few years)
kernel-apparmor.patch | 1261 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel-imq.patch | 543 ++++++++++-----------
kernel.spec | 9 +-
3 files changed, 1413 insertions(+), 400 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 9f276a4..a210d7f 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -165,9 +165,6 @@ Patch40: kernel-layer7.patch
### End netfilter
-# http://zph.bratcheda.org/linux-2.6.26.3-zph.patch
-Patch49: kernel-zph.patch
-
# http://www.linuximq.net
Patch50: kernel-imq.patch
@@ -218,7 +215,7 @@ Patch2003: kernel-regressions.patch
Patch2004: kernel-libata-ahci-pm.patch
# git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
-# branch v4.2-aa2.8-out-of-tree
+# branch v4.7-aa2.8-out-of-tree
Patch5000: kernel-apparmor.patch
# for rescuecd
@@ -669,10 +666,6 @@ cd linux-%{basever}
##
# end of netfilter
-# zph
-# FIXME or DROPME
-%patch49 -p1
-
%if %{with imq}
%patch50 -p1
%endif
diff --git a/kernel-apparmor.patch b/kernel-apparmor.patch
index d6d4585..9d10f82 100644
--- a/kernel-apparmor.patch
+++ b/kernel-apparmor.patch
@@ -1,11 +1,1064 @@
-From e37c855a09ba7a8fa69334e9e3c7f5b0f66de896 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
-Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
-Subject: UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+commit 5ea33f587f5f7324c40c5986286d0f38307923bb
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Mon Apr 11 16:55:10 2016 -0700
-Base support for network mediation.
+ apparmor: fix refcount bug in profile replacement
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 705c287..222052f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -1189,12 +1189,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ aa_get_profile(newest);
+ aa_put_profile(parent);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest);
+- } else
+- aa_put_profile(newest);
++ }
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(ent->new));
+ __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new);
++ aa_put_profile(newest);
+ } else {
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+
+commit f65b1c9b72442e6166332c04f332e4b4d4797887
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Mon Apr 11 16:57:19 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix replacement bug that adds new child to old parent
+
+ When set atomic replacement is used and the parent is updated before the
+ child, and the child did not exist in the old parent so there is no
+ direct replacement then the new child is incorrectly added to the old
+ parent. This results in the new parent not having the child(ren) that
+ it should and the old parent when being destroyed asserting the
+ following error.
+
+ AppArmor: policy_destroy: internal error, policy '<profile/name>' still
+ contains profiles
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 222052f..c92a9f6 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(ent->new));
+- __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new);
++ __list_add_profile(&newest->base.profiles, ent->new);
+ aa_put_profile(newest);
+ } else {
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+
+commit b6669bef20c9d934bc6498e79fffa220f6226518
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Sun Jun 8 11:20:54 2014 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix uninitialized lsm_audit member
+
+ BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727
+
+ The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if
+ a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur
+
+ BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08
+ IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50
+ PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0
+ Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
+ Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc]
+ CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu
+ Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011
+ task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000
+ RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50
+ RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006
+ RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000
+ RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08
+ RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0
+ R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f
+ R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830
+ FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700
+ CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+ CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
+ Stack:
+ ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009
+ 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c
+ 0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026
+ Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80
+ [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50
+ [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80
+ [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30
+ [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190
+ [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130
+ [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50
+ [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530
+ [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0
+ [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300
+ [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20
+ [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130
+ [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0
+ [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0
+ [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+index 89c7865..3a7f1da 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
+
+ if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+ (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
+- sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current);
++ sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ?
++ sa->u.tsk : current);
+
+ if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+ return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
+index d186674..4d2af4b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
+@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
+ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
++ sa.u.tsk = NULL;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = op,
+ aad.fs.request = request;
+
+commit aeab4cbfb86d0faeeb709e8201672e0662aa2c6f
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Fri Jul 25 04:02:03 2014 -0700
+
+ apparmor: exec should not be returning ENOENT when it denies
+
+ The current behavior is confusing as it causes exec failures to report
+ the executable is missing instead of identifying that apparmor
+ caused the failure.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index dc0027b..67a7418 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
+ info = "ux fallback";
+ } else {
+- error = -ENOENT;
++ error = -EACCES;
+ info = "profile not found";
+ /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
+ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+
+commit 752e4263021d90cf23c262f2fd3ebfd6dbccd455
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Fri Jul 25 04:01:56 2014 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix update the mtime of the profile file on replacement
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index ad4fa49..45a6199 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) {
+ new->dents[i] = old->dents[i];
++ if (new->dents[i])
++ new->dents[i]->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
+ old->dents[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+commit 0c67233b18406dc7a8629faf8f9452feace6fb13
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Fri Jul 25 04:02:08 2014 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix disconnected bind mnts reconnection
+
+ Bind mounts can fail to be properly reconnected when PATH_CONNECT is
+ specified. Ensure that when PATH_CONNECT is specified the path has
+ a root.
+
+ BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1319984
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
+index edddc02..f261678 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
+@@ -141,7 +141,10 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
+ error = -EACCES;
+ if (*res == '/')
+ *name = res + 1;
+- }
++ } else if (*res != '/')
++ /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
++ error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
++
+ }
+
+ out:
+
+commit 30c2b759b4f456e97e859ca550666c8abe84ff3c
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Fri Jul 25 04:02:10 2014 -0700
+
+ apparmor: internal paths should be treated as disconnected
+
+ Internal mounts are not mounted anywhere and as such should be treated
+ as disconnected paths.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
+index f261678..a8fc7d0 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
+@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+
+-
+ /* modified from dcache.c */
+ static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
+ {
+@@ -39,6 +38,38 @@ static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
+
+ #define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT)
+
++/* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
++ * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
++ * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
++ * Unless
++ * specifically directed to connect the path,
++ * OR
++ * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
++ * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
++ * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
++ * namespace root.
++ */
++static int disconnect(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name,
++ int flags)
++{
++ int error = 0;
++
++ if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
++ !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
++ our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
++ /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
++ * with '/'
++ */
++ error = -EACCES;
++ if (**name == '/')
++ *name = *name + 1;
++ } else if (**name != '/')
++ /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
++ error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
+ /**
+ * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path
+ * @path: path to lookup (NOT NULL)
+@@ -74,7 +105,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
+ * control instead of hard coded /proc
+ */
+ return prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5);
+- }
++ } else
++ return disconnect(path, buf, name, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -120,32 +152,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- /* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
+- * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
+- * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
+- * Unless
+- * specifically directed to connect the path,
+- * OR
+- * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
+- * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
+- * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
+- * namespace root.
+- */
+- if (!connected) {
+- if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
+- !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
+- our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
+- /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
+- * with '/'
+- */
+- error = -EACCES;
+- if (*res == '/')
+- *name = res + 1;
+- } else if (*res != '/')
+- /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
+- error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
+-
+- }
++ if (!connected)
++ error = disconnect(path, buf, name, flags);
+
+ out:
+ return error;
+
+commit 35f89b597a40c870f93a068bc92a7ef4f9b16a66
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Sat Apr 16 13:59:02 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix put() parent ref after updating the active ref
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index c92a9f6..455c9f8 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -1187,8 +1187,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ /* parent replaced in this atomic set? */
+ if (newest != parent) {
+ aa_get_profile(newest);
+- aa_put_profile(parent);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest);
++ aa_put_profile(parent);
+ }
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+
+commit 7b1ec6a04ca57fabe250f1102f2803dea7fbd03b
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Sat Apr 16 14:16:50 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix log failures for all profiles in a set
+
+ currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This
+ makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded
+ and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for
+ all profiles in the set being loaded.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 455c9f8..db31bc5 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ static int __lookup_replace(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname,
+ */
+ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ {
+- const char *ns_name, *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++ const char *ns_name, *info = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct aa_load_ent *ent, *tmp;
+ int op = OP_PROF_REPL;
+@@ -1082,18 +1082,15 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_prepare_namespace(ns_name);
+ if (!ns) {
+- info = "failed to prepare namespace";
+- error = -ENOMEM;
+- name = ns_name;
+- goto fail;
++ error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name,
++ "failed to prepare namespace", -ENOMEM);
++ goto free;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&ns->lock);
+ /* setup parent and ns info */
+ list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
+ struct aa_policy *policy;
+-
+- name = ent->new->base.hname;
+ error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, noreplace,
+ &ent->old, &info);
+ if (error)
+@@ -1121,7 +1118,6 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ if (!p) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ info = "parent does not exist";
+- name = ent->new->base.hname;
+ goto fail_lock;
+ }
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p));
+@@ -1214,9 +1210,22 @@ out:
+
+ fail_lock:
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+-fail:
+- error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
+
++ /* audit cause of failure */
++ op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
++ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ent->new->base.hname, info, error);
++ /* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
++ info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
++ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lh, list) {
++ if (tmp == ent) {
++ info = "unchecked profile in failed atomic policy load";
++ /* skip entry that caused failure */
++ continue;
++ }
++ op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
++ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, tmp->new->base.hname, info, error);
++ }
++free:
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
+ list_del_init(&ent->list);
+ aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+
+commit 4c475747a31b0637f0d47cb9bddaf2c6efb02854
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Sat Apr 16 14:19:38 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix audit full profile hname on successful load
+
+ Currently logging of a successful profile load only logs the basename
+ of the profile. This can result in confusion when a child profile has
+ the same name as the another profile in the set. Logging the hname
+ will ensure there is no confusion.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index db31bc5..ca402d0 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+ list_del_init(&ent->list);
+ op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+
+- audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.name, NULL, error);
++ audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.hname, NULL, error);
+
+ if (ent->old) {
+ __replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1);
+
+commit 430741dd766291d2e618b04e918ee6da844c230a
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed Apr 20 14:18:18 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: ensure the target profile name is always audited
+
+ The target profile name was not being correctly audited in a few
+ cases because the target variable was not being set and gotos
+ passed the code to set it at apply:
+
+ Since it is always based on new_profile just drop the target var
+ and conditionally report based on new_profile.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index 67a7418..fc3036b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
+ file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
+ };
+- const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
++ const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ if (cxt->onexec) {
+ struct file_perms cp;
+ info = "change_profile onexec";
++ new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+ goto audit;
+
+@@ -413,7 +414,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+
+ if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+ goto audit;
+- new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ goto apply;
+ }
+
+@@ -445,10 +445,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ if (!new_profile) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ info = "could not create null profile";
+- } else {
++ } else
+ error = -EACCES;
+- target = new_profile->base.hname;
+- }
+ perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+ } else
+ /* fail exec */
+@@ -459,7 +457,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ * fail the exec.
+ */
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
+- aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+@@ -474,10 +471,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+
+ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
+- if (error) {
+- aa_put_profile(new_profile);
++ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+- }
+ }
+
+ /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
+@@ -498,7 +493,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+ }
+ apply:
+- target = new_profile->base.hname;
+ /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+@@ -506,15 +500,19 @@ x_clear:
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
+ cxt->profile = new_profile;
++ new_profile = NULL;
+
+ /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+
+ audit:
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+- name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
++ name,
++ new_profile ? new_profile->base.hname : NULL,
++ cond.uid, info, error);
+
+ cleanup:
++ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+
+commit 06763d057300b3d5bbe1894acfe236cf193bab78
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Thu Mar 17 12:02:54 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index a689f10..c841b12 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size)
+ int index, xtype;
+ xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+ index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+- if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size)
++ if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index >= table_size)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+commit 9ad29b2e7820895339f90eb71b411d0134cf1ce9
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed Nov 18 11:41:05 2015 -0800
+
+ apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 45a6199..0d8dd71 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
+ seq_puts(seq, "\n");
+ }
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+commit e13f968d154ba9d6a2c4f82f33d3312a63430b54
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed Dec 16 18:09:10 2015 -0800
+
+ apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
+
+ When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile
+ may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but
+ before its refcount is incremented.
+
+ Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount
+ is 0 and is one its way to deletion.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index ca402d0..7807125 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -766,7 +766,9 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name)
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+- profile = aa_get_profile(__find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name));
++ do {
++ profile = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name);
++ } while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+
+commit 5833ccff1227fbc8f1bab64351f6747a6c71bdeb
+Author: Geliang Tang <geliangtang at 163.com>
+Date: Mon Nov 16 21:46:33 2015 +0800
+
+ apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
+
+ list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next
+ with it.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang at 163.com>
+ Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn at canonical.com>
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 0d8dd71..729e595 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -553,8 +553,6 @@ fail2:
+ }
+
+
+-#define list_entry_next(pos, member) \
+- list_entry(pos->member.next, typeof(*pos), member)
+ #define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) (&pos->member == (head))
+
+ /**
+@@ -585,7 +583,7 @@ static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ parent = ns->parent;
+ while (ns != root) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+- next = list_entry_next(ns, base.list);
++ next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list);
+ if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) {
+ mutex_lock(&next->lock);
+ return next;
+@@ -639,7 +637,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+ parent = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
+ mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
+ while (parent) {
+- p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
++ p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
+ if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &parent->base.profiles, base.list))
+ return p;
+ p = parent;
+@@ -648,7 +646,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+ }
+
+ /* is next another profile in the namespace */
+- p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
++ p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
+ if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list))
+ return p;
+
+
+commit 645801f1ddd183109c011e5ecee23ed3fdcae244
+Author: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm at suse.com>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 15:17:30 2015 -0500
+
+ apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
+
+ While using AppArmor, SYS_CAP_RESOURCE is insufficient to call prlimit
+ on another task. The only other example of a AppArmor mediating access to
+ another, already running, task (ignoring fork+exec) is ptrace.
+
+ The AppArmor model for ptrace is that one of the following must be true:
+ 1) The tracer is unconfined
+ 2) The tracer is in complain mode
+ 3) The tracer and tracee are confined by the same profile
+ 4) The tracer is confined but has SYS_CAP_PTRACE
+
+ 1), 2, and 3) are already true for setrlimit.
+
+ We can match the ptrace model just by allowing CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
+
+ We still test the values of the rlimit since it can always be overridden
+ using a value that means unlimited for a particular resource.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm at suse.com>
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
+index 748bf0c..67a6072 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
+@@ -101,9 +101,11 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
+ /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
+ * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+ * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
+- * the same profile.
++ * the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another
++ * task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
+ */
+- if (profile != task_profile ||
++ if ((profile != task_profile &&
++ aa_capable(profile, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) ||
+ (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
+ new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+commit 2be4aed1f3332d87273eb593944332054f3cffac
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Thu Jun 2 02:37:02 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+index 001c43a..a1c04fe 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
+ #define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6
+ #define YYTD_ID_NXT 7
+ #define YYTD_ID_TSIZE 8
++#define YYTD_ID_MAX 8
+
+ #define YYTD_DATA8 1
+ #define YYTD_DATA16 2
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
+index 727eb42..f9f57c6 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
+ * it every time we use td_id as an index
+ */
+ th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1;
++ if (th.td_id > YYTD_ID_MAX)
++ goto out;
+ th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2));
+ th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8));
+ blob += sizeof(struct table_header);
+
+commit c7f87d3c3363b1a0c4724e627e5c8e640a883c89
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed Jun 15 09:57:55 2016 +0300
+
+ apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
+index f9f57c6..32b72eb 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
+@@ -75,14 +75,14 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
+ u32, be32_to_cpu);
+ else
+ goto fail;
++ /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
++ * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
++ */
++ if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
++ vm_unmap_aliases();
+ }
+
+ out:
+- /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
+- * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
+- */
+- if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
+- vm_unmap_aliases();
+ return table;
+ fail:
+ kvfree(table);
+
+commit 0f7e61013dd1e67ebb54d58eee11ab009ceb5ef3
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed Jun 15 10:00:55 2016 +0300
+
+ apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
+
+ BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547
+
+ If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
+ profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index c841b12..dac2121 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -583,6 +583,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
+ profile->policy.dfa = NULL;
+ goto fail;
++ } else if (!profile->policy.dfa) {
++ error = -EPROTO;
++ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start"))
+ /* default start state */
+
+commit de4ca46ec035283928e8fa40797897cefcf6ec3e
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed Jun 22 18:01:08 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
+
+ the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
+ from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
+ can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
+
+ split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
+ and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index c28b0f2..52275f0 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ return profile->audit;
+ }
+
++bool policy_view_capable(void);
++bool policy_admin_capable(void);
+ bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op);
+
+ #endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 7798e16..e83eefb 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -728,51 +728,49 @@ __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
+ /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
+ static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+- if (aa_g_lock_policy)
+- return -EACCES;
+ return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+ }
+
+ static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_view_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+ }
+
+ static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+ }
+
+ static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_view_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+ }
+
+ static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_set_uint(val, kp);
+ }
+
+ static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_view_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
+ }
+
+ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_view_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+@@ -784,7 +782,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+ int i;
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+@@ -805,7 +803,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+
+ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+@@ -817,7 +815,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+ int i;
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 7807125..179e68d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -918,6 +918,22 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
+ &sa, NULL);
+ }
+
++bool policy_view_capable(void)
++{
++ struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
++ bool response = false;
++
++ if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
++ response = true;
++
++ return response;
++}
++
++bool policy_admin_capable(void)
++{
++ return policy_view_capable() && !aa_g_lock_policy;
++}
++
+ /**
+ * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
+ * @op: the policy manipulation operation being done
+@@ -932,7 +948,7 @@ bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
++ if (!policy_admin_capable()) {
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+commit 46c339f46b83e4cf8098f599cd182e65e9d054fc
+Author: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk at gmx.de>
+Date: Fri Jun 10 23:34:26 2016 +0200
+
+ apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
+
+ Do not copy uninitalized fields th.td_hilen, th.td_data.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk at gmx.de>
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
+index 32b72eb..3f900fc 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
+
+ table = kvzalloc(tsize);
+ if (table) {
+- *table = th;
++ table->td_id = th.td_id;
++ table->td_flags = th.td_flags;
++ table->td_lolen = th.td_lolen;
+ if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+ u8, byte_to_byte);
+
+commit 7e65e8142b2ea4891581173d6e92fc337b02ff8b
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Sat Jul 9 23:46:33 2016 -0700
+
+ apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index e83eefb..ba8207b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ if (!*args)
+ goto out;
+
+- arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
++ arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+
+commit b661b13237991be6b5cdf0849f137c5ec58217bf
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Mon Oct 4 15:03:36 2010 -0700
+
+ UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+ Base support for network mediation.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index 9cdec70..d5b291e 100644
@@ -92,10 +1145,10 @@ index d693df8..5dbb72f 100644
+ $(call cmd,make-af)
+ $(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-index ad4fa49..6362c5a 100644
+index 729e595..181d961 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -806,6 +806,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
AA_FS_DIR("policy", aa_fs_entry_policy),
AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
@@ -169,7 +1222,7 @@ index 0000000..cb8a121
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-index c28b0f2..b524d88 100644
+index 52275f0..4fc4dac 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
@@ -197,7 +1250,7 @@ index c28b0f2..b524d88 100644
unsigned char *hash;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-index dec607c..47fd244 100644
+index ba8207b..88d3b0a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
@@ -208,7 +1261,7 @@ index dec607c..47fd244 100644
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
-@@ -605,6 +606,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+@@ -584,6 +585,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
return error;
}
@@ -313,7 +1366,7 @@ index dec607c..47fd244 100644
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
-@@ -634,6 +733,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+@@ -613,6 +712,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
@@ -502,7 +1555,7 @@ index 0000000..003dd18
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
-index 705c287..e2afe29 100644
+index 179e68d..f1a8541 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
@@ -514,7 +1567,7 @@ index 705c287..e2afe29 100644
kzfree(profile->dirname);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-index a689f10..1a35e6b 100644
+index dac2121..0107bc4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
@@ -584,26 +1637,25 @@ index a689f10..1a35e6b 100644
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
---
-cgit v0.10.2
-
-From 6b77d90baf3807b70ca17309ad6c0bd39f3297e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
-Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
-Subject: apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network mediation
-
-If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
-either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
-denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
-1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
- tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
- should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
-2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
- This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
- they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+commit 64c5e24470a219c79c2870c63f18f6bd55648b1b
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Fri Jun 29 17:34:00 2012 -0700
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network mediation
+
+ If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+ either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+ denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+ 1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+ tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+ should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+ 2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+ This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+ they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
@@ -618,51 +1670,50 @@ index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
if (denied & kill_mask)
audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
---
-cgit v0.10.2
-From a71049ba973b214e88eae89f9cb0c4965d184ead Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
-Subject: UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
+commit f7cef61751a2382fb4ea26c18736d7552ffdb24a
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed May 16 10:58:05 2012 -0700
-Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
-rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
-
-The basic form of the rules are.
-
- [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
- [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
- [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
- [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
-
- remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
-
- where [conds] can be
- fstype=<expr>
- options=<expr>
-
-Example mount commands
- mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
-
- mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere
-
- mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount
-
- mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
-
- mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
-
- mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
-
- umount,
-
- umount /m*,
-
-See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees at ubuntu.com>
+ UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
+
+ Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+ rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+ The basic form of the rules are.
+
+ [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+ [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+ [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+ [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+ remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+ where [conds] can be
+ fstype=<expr>
+ options=<expr>
+
+ Example mount commands
+ mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+ mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+ mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount
+
+ mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+ mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+ mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+ umount,
+
+ umount /m*,
+
+ See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees at ubuntu.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 5dbb72f..89b3445 100644
@@ -678,10 +1729,10 @@ index 5dbb72f..89b3445 100644
clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-index 6362c5a..4917747 100644
+index 181d961..5fb67f6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -799,7 +799,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+@@ -800,7 +800,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1),
@@ -701,7 +1752,7 @@ index 6362c5a..4917747 100644
};
static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
-@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+@@ -808,6 +819,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network),
@@ -711,7 +1762,7 @@ index 6362c5a..4917747 100644
AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
AA_FS_DIR("caps", aa_fs_entry_caps),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
-index 89c7865..7fdb5d7 100644
+index 3a7f1da..c2a8b8a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
@@ -726,7 +1777,7 @@ index 89c7865..7fdb5d7 100644
"post_create",
"bind",
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
-index dc0027b..a2e3813 100644
+index fc3036b..f2a83b4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
@@ -797,7 +1848,7 @@ index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bc17a53
+index 0000000..a43b1d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
@@ -832,31 +1883,31 @@ index 0000000..bc17a53
+
+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+
-+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data);
+
-+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
+
+
-+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags);
+
-+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ const char *old_name);
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
-+ struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++ const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data);
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+
-+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
-+ struct path *new_path);
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++ const struct path *new_path);
+
+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-index 47fd244..fb92441 100644
+index 88d3b0a..432cbd3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
@@ -867,12 +1918,12 @@ index 47fd244..fb92441 100644
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
-@@ -492,6 +493,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+@@ -469,6 +470,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
-+static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, const char *type,
-+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
++ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
@@ -913,7 +1964,8 @@ index 47fd244..fb92441 100644
+ return error;
+}
+
-+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
++ const struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
@@ -928,7 +1980,7 @@ index 47fd244..fb92441 100644
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
char **value)
{
-@@ -710,6 +765,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+@@ -689,6 +745,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
@@ -941,7 +1993,7 @@ index 47fd244..fb92441 100644
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..478aa4d
+index 0000000..9cf9170
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
@@ -1277,13 +2329,13 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+ return 0;
+}
+
-+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
+{
+ return profile->path_flags |
+ S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
+}
+
-+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
@@ -1310,7 +2362,7 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+ return error;
+}
+
-+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
@@ -1352,7 +2404,7 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+ return error;
+}
+
-+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
@@ -1381,7 +2433,7 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+ return error;
+}
+
-+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+ const char *orig_name)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
@@ -1422,7 +2474,7 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+}
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
-+ struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++ const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
@@ -1515,8 +2567,8 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+ return error;
+}
+
-+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
-+ struct path *new_path)
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++ const struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
@@ -1565,6 +2617,3 @@ index 0000000..478aa4d
+
+ return error;
+}
---
-cgit v0.10.2
-
diff --git a/kernel-imq.patch b/kernel-imq.patch
index 2ca0201..b28cac4 100644
--- a/kernel-imq.patch
+++ b/kernel-imq.patch
@@ -1,150 +1,6 @@
-diff --git a/drivers/net/Kconfig b/drivers/net/Kconfig
-index f184fb5..0e08522 100644
---- a/drivers/net/Kconfig
-+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig
-@@ -234,6 +234,125 @@ config RIONET_RX_SIZE
- depends on RIONET
- default "128"
-
-+config IMQ
-+ tristate "IMQ (intermediate queueing device) support"
-+ depends on NETDEVICES && NETFILTER
-+ ---help---
-+ The IMQ device(s) is used as placeholder for QoS queueing
-+ disciplines. Every packet entering/leaving the IP stack can be
-+ directed through the IMQ device where it's enqueued/dequeued to the
-+ attached qdisc. This allows you to treat network devices as classes
-+ and distribute bandwidth among them. Iptables is used to specify
-+ through which IMQ device, if any, packets travel.
-+
-+ More information at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module
-+ will be called imq. If unsure, say N.
-+
-+choice
-+ prompt "IMQ behavior (PRE/POSTROUTING)"
-+ depends on IMQ
-+ default IMQ_BEHAVIOR_AB
-+ help
-+ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
-+ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
-+
-+ IMQ can work in any of the following ways:
-+
-+ PREROUTING | POSTROUTING
-+ -----------------|-------------------
-+ #1 After NAT | After NAT
-+ #2 After NAT | Before NAT
-+ #3 Before NAT | After NAT
-+ #4 Before NAT | Before NAT
-+
-+ The default behavior is to hook before NAT on PREROUTING
-+ and after NAT on POSTROUTING (#3).
-+
-+ This settings are specially usefull when trying to use IMQ
-+ to shape NATed clients.
-+
-+ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
-+
-+config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_AA
-+ bool "IMQ AA"
-+ help
-+ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
-+ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
-+
-+ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
-+
-+ PREROUTING: After NAT
-+ POSTROUTING: After NAT
-+
-+ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
-+
-+config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_AB
-+ bool "IMQ AB"
-+ help
-+ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
-+ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
-+
-+ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
-+
-+ PREROUTING: After NAT
-+ POSTROUTING: Before NAT
-+
-+ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
-+
-+config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_BA
-+ bool "IMQ BA"
-+ help
-+ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
-+ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
-+
-+ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
-+
-+ PREROUTING: Before NAT
-+ POSTROUTING: After NAT
-+
-+ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
-+
-+config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_BB
-+ bool "IMQ BB"
-+ help
-+ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
-+ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
-+
-+ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
-+
-+ PREROUTING: Before NAT
-+ POSTROUTING: Before NAT
-+
-+ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
-+
-+endchoice
-+
-+config IMQ_NUM_DEVS
-+ int "Number of IMQ devices"
-+ range 2 16
-+ depends on IMQ
-+ default "16"
-+ help
-+ This setting defines how many IMQ devices will be created.
-+
-+ The default value is 16.
-+
-+ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
-+
-+ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
-+
- config TUN
- tristate "Universal TUN/TAP device driver support"
- depends on INET
-diff --git a/drivers/net/Makefile b/drivers/net/Makefile
-index 900b0c5..e093402 100644
---- a/drivers/net/Makefile
-+++ b/drivers/net/Makefile
-@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IPVLAN) += ipvlan/
- obj-$(CONFIG_DUMMY) += dummy.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_EQUALIZER) += eql.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_IFB) += ifb.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_IMQ) += imq.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MACSEC) += macsec.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MACVLAN) += macvlan.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MACVTAP) += macvtap.o
-diff --git a/drivers/net/imq.c b/drivers/net/imq.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f80258f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/drivers/net/imq.c
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/drivers/net/imq.c linux-4.7/drivers/net/imq.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/drivers/net/imq.c 1970-01-01 07:00:00.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/drivers/net/imq.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.635901659 +0700
@@ -0,0 +1,903 @@
+/*
+ * Pseudo-driver for the intermediate queue device.
@@ -465,7 +321,7 @@ index 0000000..f80258f
+ struct nf_queue_entry *entry = skb->nf_queue_entry;
+
+ skb->nf_queue_entry = NULL;
-+ dev->trans_start = jiffies;
++ netif_trans_update(dev);
+
+ dev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
+ dev->stats.tx_packets++;
@@ -1049,11 +905,149 @@ index 0000000..f80258f
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Pseudo-driver for the intermediate queue device. See https://github.com/imq/linuximq/wiki for more information.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK("imq");
-diff --git a/include/linux/imq.h b/include/linux/imq.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1babb09
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/linux/imq.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/drivers/net/Kconfig linux-4.7/drivers/net/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.7_orig/drivers/net/Kconfig 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/drivers/net/Kconfig 2016-07-26 20:58:55.635901659 +0700
+@@ -258,6 +258,125 @@ config RIONET_RX_SIZE
+ depends on RIONET
+ default "128"
+
++config IMQ
++ tristate "IMQ (intermediate queueing device) support"
++ depends on NETDEVICES && NETFILTER
++ ---help---
++ The IMQ device(s) is used as placeholder for QoS queueing
++ disciplines. Every packet entering/leaving the IP stack can be
++ directed through the IMQ device where it's enqueued/dequeued to the
++ attached qdisc. This allows you to treat network devices as classes
++ and distribute bandwidth among them. Iptables is used to specify
++ through which IMQ device, if any, packets travel.
++
++ More information at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module
++ will be called imq. If unsure, say N.
++
++choice
++ prompt "IMQ behavior (PRE/POSTROUTING)"
++ depends on IMQ
++ default IMQ_BEHAVIOR_AB
++ help
++ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
++ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
++
++ IMQ can work in any of the following ways:
++
++ PREROUTING | POSTROUTING
++ -----------------|-------------------
++ #1 After NAT | After NAT
++ #2 After NAT | Before NAT
++ #3 Before NAT | After NAT
++ #4 Before NAT | Before NAT
++
++ The default behavior is to hook before NAT on PREROUTING
++ and after NAT on POSTROUTING (#3).
++
++ This settings are specially usefull when trying to use IMQ
++ to shape NATed clients.
++
++ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
++
++config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_AA
++ bool "IMQ AA"
++ help
++ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
++ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
++
++ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
++
++ PREROUTING: After NAT
++ POSTROUTING: After NAT
++
++ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
++
++config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_AB
++ bool "IMQ AB"
++ help
++ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
++ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
++
++ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
++
++ PREROUTING: After NAT
++ POSTROUTING: Before NAT
++
++ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
++
++config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_BA
++ bool "IMQ BA"
++ help
++ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
++ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
++
++ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
++
++ PREROUTING: Before NAT
++ POSTROUTING: After NAT
++
++ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
++
++config IMQ_BEHAVIOR_BB
++ bool "IMQ BB"
++ help
++ This setting defines how IMQ behaves in respect to its
++ hooking in PREROUTING and POSTROUTING.
++
++ Choosing this option will make IMQ hook like this:
++
++ PREROUTING: Before NAT
++ POSTROUTING: Before NAT
++
++ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
++
++endchoice
++
++config IMQ_NUM_DEVS
++ int "Number of IMQ devices"
++ range 2 16
++ depends on IMQ
++ default "16"
++ help
++ This setting defines how many IMQ devices will be created.
++
++ The default value is 16.
++
++ More information can be found at: https://github.com/imq/linuximq
++
++ If not sure leave the default settings alone.
++
+ config TUN
+ tristate "Universal TUN/TAP device driver support"
+ depends on INET
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/drivers/net/Makefile linux-4.7/drivers/net/Makefile
+--- linux-4.7_orig/drivers/net/Makefile 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/drivers/net/Makefile 2016-07-26 20:58:55.635901659 +0700
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DUMMY) += dummy.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EQUALIZER) += eql.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IFB) += ifb.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_MACSEC) += macsec.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_IMQ) += imq.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_MACVLAN) += macvlan.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_MACVTAP) += macvtap.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_MII) += mii.o
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/imq.h linux-4.7/include/linux/imq.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/imq.h 1970-01-01 07:00:00.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/linux/imq.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.639235009 +0700
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#ifndef _IMQ_H
+#define _IMQ_H
@@ -1068,11 +1062,10 @@ index 0000000..1babb09
+
+#endif /* _IMQ_H */
+
-diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h
-index 3143c84..e213b31 100644
---- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
-+++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
-@@ -3341,6 +3341,19 @@ static inline void netif_tx_unlock_bh(struct net_device *dev)
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netdevice.h linux-4.7/include/linux/netdevice.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netdevice.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/linux/netdevice.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.639235009 +0700
+@@ -3558,6 +3558,19 @@ static inline void netif_tx_unlock_bh(st
} \
}
@@ -1092,11 +1085,9 @@ index 3143c84..e213b31 100644
static inline void netif_tx_disable(struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned int i;
-diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9b07230
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h linux-4.7/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h 1970-01-01 07:00:00.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/linux/netfilter/xt_IMQ.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.639235009 +0700
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#ifndef _XT_IMQ_H
+#define _XT_IMQ_H
@@ -1107,11 +1098,9 @@ index 0000000..9b07230
+
+#endif /* _XT_IMQ_H */
+
-diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..7af320f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h linux-4.7/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h 1970-01-01 07:00:00.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_IMQ.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.639235009 +0700
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef _IPT_IMQ_H
+#define _IPT_IMQ_H
@@ -1123,11 +1112,9 @@ index 0000000..7af320f
+
+#endif /* _IPT_IMQ_H */
+
-diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..198ac01
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h linux-4.7/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h 1970-01-01 07:00:00.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_IMQ.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.639235009 +0700
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef _IP6T_IMQ_H
+#define _IP6T_IMQ_H
@@ -1139,10 +1126,9 @@ index 0000000..198ac01
+
+#endif /* _IP6T_IMQ_H */
+
-diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
-index 4355129..47914c0 100644
---- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
-+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/skbuff.h linux-4.7/include/linux/skbuff.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/linux/skbuff.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/linux/skbuff.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.639235009 +0700
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@
#include <linux/splice.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
@@ -1152,9 +1138,9 @@ index 4355129..47914c0 100644
+#endif
+
- /* A. Checksumming of received packets by device.
- *
-@@ -566,6 +570,9 @@ struct sk_buff {
+ /* The interface for checksum offload between the stack and networking drivers
+ * is as follows...
+@@ -647,6 +651,9 @@ struct sk_buff {
* first. This is owned by whoever has the skb queued ATM.
*/
char cb[48] __aligned(8);
@@ -1164,7 +1150,7 @@ index 4355129..47914c0 100644
unsigned long _skb_refdst;
void (*destructor)(struct sk_buff *skb);
-@@ -575,6 +582,9 @@ struct sk_buff {
+@@ -656,6 +663,9 @@ struct sk_buff {
#if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MODULE)
struct nf_conntrack *nfct;
#endif
@@ -1174,7 +1160,7 @@ index 4355129..47914c0 100644
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER)
struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge;
#endif
-@@ -642,6 +652,9 @@ struct sk_buff {
+@@ -723,6 +733,9 @@ struct sk_buff {
__u8 inner_protocol_type:1;
__u8 remcsum_offload:1;
/* 3 or 5 bit hole */
@@ -1184,7 +1170,7 @@ index 4355129..47914c0 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED
__u16 tc_index; /* traffic control index */
-@@ -798,6 +811,12 @@ void kfree_skb_list(struct sk_buff *segs);
+@@ -879,6 +892,12 @@ void kfree_skb_list(struct sk_buff *segs
void skb_tx_error(struct sk_buff *skb);
void consume_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
void __kfree_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
@@ -1197,7 +1183,7 @@ index 4355129..47914c0 100644
extern struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache;
void kfree_skb_partial(struct sk_buff *skb, bool head_stolen);
-@@ -3344,6 +3363,10 @@ static inline void __nf_copy(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct sk_buff *src,
+@@ -3523,6 +3542,10 @@ static inline void __nf_copy(struct sk_b
if (copy)
dst->nfctinfo = src->nfctinfo;
#endif
@@ -1208,13 +1194,12 @@ index 4355129..47914c0 100644
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER)
dst->nf_bridge = src->nf_bridge;
nf_bridge_get(src->nf_bridge);
-diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h
-index 9c5638a..b173aa7 100644
---- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h
-+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h linux-4.7/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.642568359 +0700
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ struct nf_queue_handler {
- void nf_register_queue_handler(const struct nf_queue_handler *qh);
- void nf_unregister_queue_handler(void);
+ void nf_register_queue_handler(struct net *net, const struct nf_queue_handler *qh);
+ void nf_unregister_queue_handler(struct net *net);
void nf_reinject(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int verdict);
+void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry);
+
@@ -1225,11 +1210,10 @@ index 9c5638a..b173aa7 100644
void nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry);
void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry);
-diff --git a/include/net/pkt_sched.h b/include/net/pkt_sched.h
-index 401038d..4668849 100644
---- a/include/net/pkt_sched.h
-+++ b/include/net/pkt_sched.h
-@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int sch_direct_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *q,
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/net/pkt_sched.h linux-4.7/include/net/pkt_sched.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/net/pkt_sched.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/net/pkt_sched.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.642568359 +0700
+@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ int sch_direct_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
void __qdisc_run(struct Qdisc *q);
@@ -1238,11 +1222,10 @@ index 401038d..4668849 100644
static inline void qdisc_run(struct Qdisc *q)
{
if (qdisc_run_begin(q))
-diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h
-index b2a8e63..d9feaa3 100644
---- a/include/net/sch_generic.h
-+++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h
-@@ -506,6 +506,12 @@ static inline int qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch)
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/net/sch_generic.h linux-4.7/include/net/sch_generic.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/net/sch_generic.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/net/sch_generic.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.642568359 +0700
+@@ -523,6 +523,12 @@ static inline int qdisc_enqueue(struct s
return sch->enqueue(skb, sch);
}
@@ -1255,10 +1238,9 @@ index b2a8e63..d9feaa3 100644
static inline bool qdisc_is_percpu_stats(const struct Qdisc *q)
{
return q->flags & TCQ_F_CPUSTATS;
-diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h
-index d93f949..23fb6d1 100644
---- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h
-+++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h linux-4.7/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/include/uapi/linux/netfilter.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.642568359 +0700
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
#define NF_QUEUE 3
#define NF_REPEAT 4
@@ -1269,11 +1251,10 @@ index d93f949..23fb6d1 100644
/* we overload the higher bits for encoding auxiliary data such as the queue
* number or errno values. Not nice, but better than additional function
-diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
-index ae00b89..1cdcd02 100644
---- a/net/core/dev.c
-+++ b/net/core/dev.c
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/core/dev.c linux-4.7/net/core/dev.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/core/dev.c 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/core/dev.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.642568359 +0700
+@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@
#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ingress.h>
#include <linux/sctp.h>
@@ -1283,7 +1264,7 @@ index ae00b89..1cdcd02 100644
#include "net-sysfs.h"
-@@ -2705,7 +2708,12 @@ static int xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
+@@ -2908,7 +2911,12 @@ static int xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int len;
int rc;
@@ -1296,7 +1277,7 @@ index ae00b89..1cdcd02 100644
dev_queue_xmit_nit(skb, dev);
len = skb->len;
-@@ -2743,6 +2751,7 @@ out:
+@@ -2946,6 +2954,7 @@ out:
*ret = rc;
return skb;
}
@@ -1304,7 +1285,7 @@ index ae00b89..1cdcd02 100644
static struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_vlan(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
-@@ -2831,6 +2840,7 @@ struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_skb_list(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *d
+@@ -3032,6 +3041,7 @@ struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_skb_list(s
}
return head;
}
@@ -1312,11 +1293,10 @@ index ae00b89..1cdcd02 100644
static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
-diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
-index b2df375..bc3c51e 100644
---- a/net/core/skbuff.c
-+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
-@@ -79,6 +79,87 @@
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/core/skbuff.c linux-4.7/net/core/skbuff.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/core/skbuff.c 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/core/skbuff.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.645901708 +0700
+@@ -81,6 +81,87 @@ struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache __r
static struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache __read_mostly;
int sysctl_max_skb_frags __read_mostly = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_max_skb_frags);
@@ -1404,7 +1384,7 @@ index b2df375..bc3c51e 100644
/**
* skb_panic - private function for out-of-line support
-@@ -643,6 +724,28 @@ static void skb_release_head_state(struct sk_buff *skb)
+@@ -653,6 +734,28 @@ static void skb_release_head_state(struc
WARN_ON(in_irq());
skb->destructor(skb);
}
@@ -1433,7 +1413,7 @@ index b2df375..bc3c51e 100644
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK)
nf_conntrack_put(skb->nfct);
#endif
-@@ -765,6 +868,10 @@ static void __copy_skb_header(struct sk_buff *new, const struct sk_buff *old)
+@@ -842,6 +945,10 @@ static void __copy_skb_header(struct sk_
new->sp = secpath_get(old->sp);
#endif
__nf_copy(new, old, false);
@@ -1444,7 +1424,7 @@ index b2df375..bc3c51e 100644
/* Note : this field could be in headers_start/headers_end section
* It is not yet because we do not want to have a 16 bit hole
-@@ -3325,6 +3432,13 @@ void __init skb_init(void)
+@@ -3433,6 +3540,13 @@ void __init skb_init(void)
0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
NULL);
@@ -1458,11 +1438,10 @@ index b2df375..bc3c51e 100644
}
/**
-diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
-index e6a7bd15..c81496e 100644
---- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
-+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
-@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c linux-4.7/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.645901708 +0700
+@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net
struct in6_addr *nexthop;
int ret;
@@ -1472,7 +1451,7 @@ index e6a7bd15..c81496e 100644
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
-@@ -142,6 +139,13 @@ int ip6_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+@@ -142,6 +139,13 @@ int ip6_output(struct net *net, struct s
return 0;
}
@@ -1486,11 +1465,27 @@ index e6a7bd15..c81496e 100644
return NF_HOOK_COND(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
net, sk, skb, NULL, dev,
ip6_finish_output,
-diff --git a/net/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/netfilter/Kconfig
-index 4692782..dce47db 100644
---- a/net/netfilter/Kconfig
-+++ b/net/netfilter/Kconfig
-@@ -785,6 +785,18 @@ config NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_LOG
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/core.c linux-4.7/net/netfilter/core.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/core.c 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/netfilter/core.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.645901708 +0700
+@@ -311,9 +311,11 @@ next_hook:
+ ret = NF_DROP_GETERR(verdict);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -EPERM;
+- } else if ((verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK) == NF_QUEUE) {
++ } else if ((verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK) == NF_QUEUE ||
++ (verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK) == NF_IMQ_QUEUE) {
+ int err = nf_queue(skb, elem, state,
+- verdict >> NF_VERDICT_QBITS);
++ verdict >> NF_VERDICT_QBITS,
++ verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ if (err == -ESRCH &&
+ (verdict & NF_VERDICT_FLAG_QUEUE_BYPASS))
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/Kconfig linux-4.7/net/netfilter/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/Kconfig 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/netfilter/Kconfig 2016-07-26 20:58:55.645901708 +0700
+@@ -807,6 +807,18 @@ config NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_LOG
To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N.
@@ -1509,11 +1504,10 @@ index 4692782..dce47db 100644
config NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_MARK
tristate '"MARK" target support'
depends on NETFILTER_ADVANCED
-diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
-index 7638c36..614ad8a 100644
---- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
-+++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
-@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CT) += xt_CT.o
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/Makefile linux-4.7/net/netfilter/Makefile
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/Makefile 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/netfilter/Makefile 2016-07-26 20:58:55.645901708 +0700
+@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CT) +=
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_DSCP) += xt_DSCP.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_HL) += xt_HL.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_HMARK) += xt_HMARK.o
@@ -1521,29 +1515,10 @@ index 7638c36..614ad8a 100644
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_LED) += xt_LED.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_LOG) += xt_LOG.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_NETMAP) += xt_NETMAP.o
-diff --git a/net/netfilter/core.c b/net/netfilter/core.c
-index f39276d..9877a27 100644
---- a/net/netfilter/core.c
-+++ b/net/netfilter/core.c
-@@ -311,9 +311,11 @@ next_hook:
- ret = NF_DROP_GETERR(verdict);
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = -EPERM;
-- } else if ((verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK) == NF_QUEUE) {
-+ } else if ((verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK) == NF_QUEUE ||
-+ (verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK) == NF_IMQ_QUEUE) {
- int err = nf_queue(skb, elem, state,
-- verdict >> NF_VERDICT_QBITS);
-+ verdict >> NF_VERDICT_QBITS,
-+ verdict & NF_VERDICT_MASK);
- if (err < 0) {
- if (err == -ESRCH &&
- (verdict & NF_VERDICT_FLAG_QUEUE_BYPASS))
-diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h b/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h
-index 0655225..25d4141 100644
---- a/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h
-+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ unsigned int nf_iterate(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb,
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h linux-4.7/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/netfilter/nf_internals.h 2016-07-26 20:58:55.645901708 +0700
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ unsigned int nf_iterate(struct list_head
/* nf_queue.c */
int nf_queue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_hook_ops *elem,
@@ -1552,13 +1527,12 @@ index 0655225..25d4141 100644
void nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(struct net *net, struct nf_hook_ops *ops);
int __init netfilter_queue_init(void);
-diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
-index 5baa8e2..9740e8c 100644
---- a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
-+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,23 @@
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c linux-4.7/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.649235058 +0700
+@@ -27,6 +27,23 @@
+ * receives, no matter what.
*/
- static const struct nf_queue_handler __rcu *queue_handler __read_mostly;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMQ) || defined(CONFIG_IMQ_MODULE)
+static const struct nf_queue_handler __rcu *queue_imq_handler __read_mostly;
@@ -1579,8 +1553,8 @@ index 5baa8e2..9740e8c 100644
+
/* return EBUSY when somebody else is registered, return EEXIST if the
* same handler is registered, return 0 in case of success. */
- void nf_register_queue_handler(const struct nf_queue_handler *qh)
-@@ -116,7 +133,8 @@ void nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(struct net *net, struct nf_hook_ops *ops)
+ void nf_register_queue_handler(struct net *net, const struct nf_queue_handler *qh)
+@@ -114,7 +131,8 @@ void nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(struct net *n
int nf_queue(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct nf_hook_ops *elem,
struct nf_hook_state *state,
@@ -1590,11 +1564,11 @@ index 5baa8e2..9740e8c 100644
{
int status = -ENOENT;
struct nf_queue_entry *entry = NULL;
-@@ -124,7 +142,17 @@ int nf_queue(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_queue_handler *qh;
+@@ -123,7 +141,17 @@ int nf_queue(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct net *net = state->net;
/* QUEUE == DROP if no one is waiting, to be safe. */
-- qh = rcu_dereference(queue_handler);
+- qh = rcu_dereference(net->nf.queue_handler);
+ if (queuetype == NF_IMQ_QUEUE) {
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMQ) || defined(CONFIG_IMQ_MODULE)
+ qh = rcu_dereference(queue_imq_handler);
@@ -1603,13 +1577,13 @@ index 5baa8e2..9740e8c 100644
+ goto err_unlock;
+#endif
+ } else {
-+ qh = rcu_dereference(queue_handler);
++ qh = rcu_dereference(net->nf.queue_handler);
+ }
+
if (!qh) {
status = -ESRCH;
goto err;
-@@ -199,8 +227,10 @@ void nf_reinject(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int verdict)
+@@ -198,8 +226,10 @@ void nf_reinject(struct nf_queue_entry *
local_bh_enable();
break;
case NF_QUEUE:
@@ -1621,11 +1595,9 @@ index 5baa8e2..9740e8c 100644
if (err < 0) {
if (err == -ESRCH &&
(verdict & NF_VERDICT_FLAG_QUEUE_BYPASS))
-diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c b/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..86d7b84
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c linux-4.7/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c 1970-01-01 07:00:00.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/netfilter/xt_IMQ.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.649235058 +0700
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * This target marks packets to be enqueued to an imq device
@@ -1693,17 +1665,16 @@ index 0000000..86d7b84
+module_init(imq_init);
+module_exit(imq_fini);
+
-+MODULE_AUTHOR("http://https://github.com/imq/linuximq");
++MODULE_AUTHOR("https://github.com/imq/linuximq");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Pseudo-driver for the intermediate queue device. See https://github.com/imq/linuximq/wiki for more information.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS("ipt_IMQ");
+MODULE_ALIAS("ip6t_IMQ");
+
-diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
-index e82a1ad..b55331d 100644
---- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
-+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
-@@ -108,6 +108,14 @@ static struct sk_buff *dequeue_skb(struct Qdisc *q, bool *validate,
+diff -Naupr linux-4.7_orig/net/sched/sch_generic.c linux-4.7/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+--- linux-4.7_orig/net/sched/sch_generic.c 2016-07-25 02:23:50.000000000 +0700
++++ linux-4.7/net/sched/sch_generic.c 2016-07-26 20:58:55.649235058 +0700
+@@ -110,6 +110,14 @@ static struct sk_buff *dequeue_skb(struc
return skb;
}
@@ -1715,6 +1686,6 @@ index e82a1ad..b55331d 100644
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_dequeue_skb);
+
- static inline int handle_dev_cpu_collision(struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
- struct Qdisc *q)
+ /*
+ * Transmit possibly several skbs, and handle the return status as
+ * required. Holding the __QDISC___STATE_RUNNING bit guarantees that
================================================================
---- gitweb:
http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/kernel.git/commitdiff/0776672ee02c20aad1fc3255f8d47289c503a927
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