[packages/kernel/LINUX_3_18] - 3.18.39, added fix for CVE-2016-5696
baggins
baggins at pld-linux.org
Sun Aug 21 10:29:46 CEST 2016
commit 167e3e5a745fe1f835a9918c40287ed05eb7cfc4
Author: Jan Rękorajski <baggins at pld-linux.org>
Date: Sun Aug 21 10:29:06 2016 +0200
- 3.18.39, added fix for CVE-2016-5696
kernel-small_fixes.patch | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel.spec | 4 +-
2 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index dd28fd6..f70d05b 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
%define rel 1
%define basever 3.18
-%define postver .38
+%define postver .39
# define this to '-%{basever}' for longterm branch
%define versuffix -%{basever}
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ Source0: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/linux-%{basever}.tar.xz
# Source0-md5: 9e854df51ca3fef8bfe566dbd7b89241
%if "%{postver}" != ".0"
Patch0: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/patch-%{version}.xz
-# Patch0-md5: c116dc0f1d18c503d3f2ffd24d0a2b48
+# Patch0-md5: bac79805cf2ba55c8b10dbc48fc5d32f
%endif
Source1: kernel.sysconfig
diff --git a/kernel-small_fixes.patch b/kernel-small_fixes.patch
index d4b6034..75bcd27 100644
--- a/kernel-small_fixes.patch
+++ b/kernel-small_fixes.patch
@@ -26,3 +26,122 @@
exit
fi
done
+From a0d876bf464ea9abeb3f74aaf6737b6bcfd650c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:04:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 2797
+Lines: 78
+
+[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]
+
+Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
+(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
+to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
+paper.
+
+This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
+some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
+sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
+
+Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
+
+Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
+to remove the host limit in the future.
+
+v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
+
+Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
+Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009 at ucr.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
+Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
+Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
+Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
+Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_most
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
+
+ /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
+-int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
++int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
+
+ int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
+ int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
+@@ -3293,12 +3293,18 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
+ static u32 challenge_timestamp;
+ static unsigned int challenge_count;
+ u32 now = jiffies / HZ;
++ u32 count;
+
+ if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
++ u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
++
+ challenge_timestamp = now;
+- challenge_count = 0;
++ challenge_count = half +
++ prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
+ }
+- if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
++ count = challenge_count;
++ if (count > 0) {
++ challenge_count = count - 1;
+ NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
+ tcp_send_ack(sk);
+ }
+From foo at baz Wed Aug 17 10:00:14 CEST 2016
+Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 10:00:14 +0200
+To: Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
+Subject: tcp: make challenge acks faster
+
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
+
+When backporting upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd ("tcp: make challenge acks
+less predictable") I negelected to use the correct ACCESS* type macros.
+This fixes that up to hopefully speed things up a bit more.
+
+Thanks to Chas Wiliams for the 3.10 backport which reminded me of this.
+
+Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009 at ucr.edu>
+Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
+Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
+Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
+Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
+Cc: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
+Cc: Chas Williams <ciwillia at brocade.com>
+Cc: Willy Tarreau <w at 1wt.eu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+@@ -3299,12 +3299,12 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
+ u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
+
+ challenge_timestamp = now;
+- challenge_count = half +
++ ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = half +
+ prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
+ }
+- count = challenge_count;
++ count = ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count);
+ if (count > 0) {
+- challenge_count = count - 1;
++ ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = count - 1;
+ NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
+ tcp_send_ack(sk);
+ }
================================================================
---- gitweb:
http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/kernel.git/commitdiff/167e3e5a745fe1f835a9918c40287ed05eb7cfc4
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