[packages/postgresql] Rel 2; backport changes that fix segfault with openssl 3.2

arekm arekm at pld-linux.org
Tue Jan 2 17:49:17 CET 2024


commit d1be35eddc349bc8703fb42b72375d4a7701750a
Author: Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz <arekm at maven.pl>
Date:   Tue Jan 2 17:49:08 2024 +0100

    Rel 2; backport changes that fix segfault with openssl 3.2

 openssl32.patch | 537 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 postgresql.spec |   6 +-
 2 files changed, 540 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/postgresql.spec b/postgresql.spec
index 6e65f5f..5c53ba5 100644
--- a/postgresql.spec
+++ b/postgresql.spec
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Summary(uk.UTF-8):	PostgreSQL - система керування базами 
 Summary(zh_CN.UTF-8):	PostgreSQL 客户端程序和库文件
 Name:		postgresql
 Version:	%{mver}.5
-Release:	1
+Release:	2
 License:	BSD
 Group:		Applications/Databases
 Source0:	https://ftp.postgresql.org/pub/source/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.bz2
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Patch0:		%{name}-conf.patch
 Patch1:		%{name}-absolute_dbpaths.patch
 Patch2:		%{name}-ecpg-includedir.patch
 Patch3:		ac.patch
-
+Patch4:		openssl32.patch
 Patch5:		%{name}-heimdal.patch
 Patch6:		%{name}-link.patch
 URL:		https://www.postgresql.org/
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ Różne moduły dołączone do PostgreSQL-a.
 %{?with_absolute_dbpaths:%patch1 -p1}
 %patch2 -p1
 %patch3 -p1
-
+%patch4 -p1
 %patch5 -p1
 %patch6 -p1
 
diff --git a/openssl32.patch b/openssl32.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa2743e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl32.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+commit b97226815030be274f13a114cf8ebf0063899c41
+Author: Michael Paquier <michael at paquier.xyz>
+Date:   Mon Nov 27 09:40:50 2023 +0900
+
+    Fix race condition with BIO methods initialization in libpq with threads
+    
+    The libpq code in charge of creating per-connection SSL objects was
+    prone to a race condition when loading the custom BIO methods needed by
+    my_SSL_set_fd().  As BIO methods are stored as a static variable, the
+    initialization of a connection could fail because it could be possible
+    to have one thread refer to my_bio_methods while it is being manipulated
+    by a second concurrent thread.
+    
+    This error has been introduced by 8bb14cdd33de, that has removed
+    ssl_config_mutex around the call of my_SSL_set_fd(), that itself sets
+    the custom BIO methods used in libpq.  Like previously, the BIO method
+    initialization is now protected by the existing ssl_config_mutex, itself
+    initialized earlier for WIN32.
+    
+    While on it, document that my_bio_methods is protected by
+    ssl_config_mutex, as this can be easy to miss.
+    
+    Reported-by: Willi Mann
+    Author: Willi Mann, Michael Paquier
+    Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e77abc4c-4d03-4058-a9d7-ef0035657e04@celonis.com
+    Backpatch-through: 12
+
+diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+index af59ff49f7..62f813df68 100644
+--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+@@ -1805,6 +1805,7 @@ PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+ #define BIO_set_data(bio, data) (bio->ptr = data)
+ #endif
+ 
++/* protected by ssl_config_mutex */
+ static BIO_METHOD *my_bio_methods;
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -1870,6 +1871,15 @@ my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size)
+ static BIO_METHOD *
+ my_BIO_s_socket(void)
+ {
++	BIO_METHOD *res;
++
++#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
++	if (pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_config_mutex))
++		return NULL;
++#endif
++
++	res = my_bio_methods;
++
+ 	if (!my_bio_methods)
+ 	{
+ 		BIO_METHOD *biom = (BIO_METHOD *) BIO_s_socket();
+@@ -1878,39 +1888,58 @@ my_BIO_s_socket(void)
+ 
+ 		my_bio_index = BIO_get_new_index();
+ 		if (my_bio_index == -1)
+-			return NULL;
++			goto err;
+ 		my_bio_index |= (BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR | BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK);
+-		my_bio_methods = BIO_meth_new(my_bio_index, "libpq socket");
+-		if (!my_bio_methods)
+-			return NULL;
++		res = BIO_meth_new(my_bio_index, "libpq socket");
++		if (!res)
++			goto err;
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * As of this writing, these functions never fail. But check anyway,
+ 		 * like OpenSSL's own examples do.
+ 		 */
+-		if (!BIO_meth_set_write(my_bio_methods, my_sock_write) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_read(my_bio_methods, my_sock_read) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_gets(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_gets(biom)) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_puts(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_puts(biom)) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_ctrl(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_ctrl(biom)) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_create(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_create(biom)) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_destroy(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_destroy(biom)) ||
+-			!BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(biom)))
++		if (!BIO_meth_set_write(res, my_sock_write) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_read(res, my_sock_read) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_gets(res, BIO_meth_get_gets(biom)) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_puts(res, BIO_meth_get_puts(biom)) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_ctrl(res, BIO_meth_get_ctrl(biom)) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_create(res, BIO_meth_get_create(biom)) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_destroy(res, BIO_meth_get_destroy(biom)) ||
++			!BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(res, BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(biom)))
+ 		{
+-			BIO_meth_free(my_bio_methods);
+-			my_bio_methods = NULL;
+-			return NULL;
++			goto err;
+ 		}
+ #else
+-		my_bio_methods = malloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
+-		if (!my_bio_methods)
+-			return NULL;
+-		memcpy(my_bio_methods, biom, sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
+-		my_bio_methods->bread = my_sock_read;
+-		my_bio_methods->bwrite = my_sock_write;
++		res = malloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
++		if (!res)
++			goto err;
++		memcpy(res, biom, sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
++		res->bread = my_sock_read;
++		res->bwrite = my_sock_write;
+ #endif
+ 	}
+-	return my_bio_methods;
++
++	my_bio_methods = res;
++
++#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
++	pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
++#endif
++
++	return res;
++
++err:
++#ifdef HAVE_BIO_METH_NEW
++	if (res)
++		BIO_meth_free(res);
++#else
++	if (res)
++		free(res);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
++	pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
++#endif
++	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This should exactly match OpenSSL's SSL_set_fd except for using my BIO */
+commit 5dd30bb54bfec14e5677aff3e306edec79c204ef
+Author: Tom Lane <tgl at sss.pgh.pa.us>
+Date:   Tue Nov 28 12:34:03 2023 -0500
+
+    Use BIO_{get,set}_app_data instead of BIO_{get,set}_data.
+    
+    We should have done it this way all along, but we accidentally got
+    away with using the wrong BIO field up until OpenSSL 3.2.  There,
+    the library's BIO routines that we rely on use the "data" field
+    for their own purposes, and our conflicting use causes assorted
+    weird behaviors up to and including core dumps when SSL connections
+    are attempted.  Switch to using the approved field for the purpose,
+    i.e. app_data.
+    
+    While at it, remove our configure probes for BIO_get_data as well
+    as the fallback implementation.  BIO_{get,set}_app_data have been
+    there since long before any OpenSSL version that we still support,
+    even in the back branches.
+    
+    Also, update src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl to allow for a minor
+    change in an error message spelling that evidently came in with 3.2.
+    
+    Tristan Partin and Bo Andreson.  Back-patch to all supported branches.
+    
+    Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAN55FZ1eDDYsYaL7mv+oSLUij2h_u6hvD4Qmv-7PK7jkji0uyQ@mail.gmail.com
+
+diff --git a/configure b/configure
+index d83a402ea1..d55440cd6a 100755
+--- a/configure
++++ b/configure
+@@ -13239,7 +13239,7 @@ done
+   # defines OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to claim version 2.0.0, even though it
+   # doesn't have these OpenSSL 1.1.0 functions. So check for individual
+   # functions.
+-  for ac_func in OPENSSL_init_ssl BIO_get_data BIO_meth_new ASN1_STRING_get0_data HMAC_CTX_new HMAC_CTX_free
++  for ac_func in OPENSSL_init_ssl BIO_meth_new ASN1_STRING_get0_data HMAC_CTX_new HMAC_CTX_free
+ do :
+   as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+ ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 570daced81..2bc752ca1a 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
+   # defines OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to claim version 2.0.0, even though it
+   # doesn't have these OpenSSL 1.1.0 functions. So check for individual
+   # functions.
+-  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OPENSSL_init_ssl BIO_get_data BIO_meth_new ASN1_STRING_get0_data HMAC_CTX_new HMAC_CTX_free])
++  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OPENSSL_init_ssl BIO_meth_new ASN1_STRING_get0_data HMAC_CTX_new HMAC_CTX_free])
+   # OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 required setting callback functions, for
+   # thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
+   # function was removed.
+diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+index f5c5ed210e..aed8a75345 100644
+--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
++++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+@@ -839,11 +839,6 @@ be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+  * to retry; do we need to adopt their logic for that?
+  */
+ 
+-#ifndef HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA
+-#define BIO_get_data(bio) (bio->ptr)
+-#define BIO_set_data(bio, data) (bio->ptr = data)
+-#endif
+-
+ static BIO_METHOD *my_bio_methods = NULL;
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -853,7 +848,7 @@ my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
+ 
+ 	if (buf != NULL)
+ 	{
+-		res = secure_raw_read(((Port *) BIO_get_data(h)), buf, size);
++		res = secure_raw_read(((Port *) BIO_get_app_data(h)), buf, size);
+ 		BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+ 		if (res <= 0)
+ 		{
+@@ -873,7 +868,7 @@ my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size)
+ {
+ 	int			res = 0;
+ 
+-	res = secure_raw_write(((Port *) BIO_get_data(h)), buf, size);
++	res = secure_raw_write(((Port *) BIO_get_app_data(h)), buf, size);
+ 	BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+ 	if (res <= 0)
+ 	{
+@@ -949,7 +944,7 @@ my_SSL_set_fd(Port *port, int fd)
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ 		goto err;
+ 	}
+-	BIO_set_data(bio, port);
++	BIO_set_app_data(bio, port);
+ 
+ 	BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ 	SSL_set_bio(port->ssl, bio, bio);
+diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+index d09e9f9a1c..768e3d719c 100644
+--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
++++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+@@ -77,9 +77,6 @@
+ /* Define to 1 if you have the `backtrace_symbols' function. */
+ #undef HAVE_BACKTRACE_SYMBOLS
+ 
+-/* Define to 1 if you have the `BIO_get_data' function. */
+-#undef HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA
+-
+ /* Define to 1 if you have the `BIO_meth_new' function. */
+ #undef HAVE_BIO_METH_NEW
+ 
+diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+index 62f813df68..d863d279a0 100644
+--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+@@ -1800,11 +1800,6 @@ PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+  * to retry; do we need to adopt their logic for that?
+  */
+ 
+-#ifndef HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA
+-#define BIO_get_data(bio) (bio->ptr)
+-#define BIO_set_data(bio, data) (bio->ptr = data)
+-#endif
+-
+ /* protected by ssl_config_mutex */
+ static BIO_METHOD *my_bio_methods;
+ 
+@@ -1813,7 +1808,7 @@ my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
+ {
+ 	int			res;
+ 
+-	res = pqsecure_raw_read((PGconn *) BIO_get_data(h), buf, size);
++	res = pqsecure_raw_read((PGconn *) BIO_get_app_data(h), buf, size);
+ 	BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+ 	if (res < 0)
+ 	{
+@@ -1843,7 +1838,7 @@ my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size)
+ {
+ 	int			res;
+ 
+-	res = pqsecure_raw_write((PGconn *) BIO_get_data(h), buf, size);
++	res = pqsecure_raw_write((PGconn *) BIO_get_app_data(h), buf, size);
+ 	BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+ 	if (res < 0)
+ 	{
+@@ -1962,7 +1957,7 @@ my_SSL_set_fd(PGconn *conn, int fd)
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ 		goto err;
+ 	}
+-	BIO_set_data(bio, conn);
++	BIO_set_app_data(bio, conn);
+ 
+ 	SSL_set_bio(conn->ssl, bio, bio);
+ 	BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+index 707f4005af..c570b48a1b 100644
+--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
++++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ $node->connect_fails(
+ 	"$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt "
+ 	  . sslkey('client-revoked.key'),
+ 	"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert",
+-	expected_stderr => qr/SSL error: sslv3 alert certificate revoked/,
++	expected_stderr => qr|SSL error: ssl[a-z0-9/]* alert certificate revoked|,
+ 	# revoked certificates should not authenticate the user
+ 	log_unlike => [qr/connection authenticated:/],);
+ 
+@@ -743,6 +743,6 @@ $node->connect_fails(
+ 	"$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt "
+ 	  . sslkey('client-revoked.key'),
+ 	"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory",
+-	expected_stderr => qr/SSL error: sslv3 alert certificate revoked/);
++	expected_stderr => qr|SSL error: ssl[a-z0-9/]* alert certificate revoked|);
+ 
+ done_testing();
+diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+index 790f03b05e..a53239fa28 100644
+--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
++++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+@@ -226,7 +226,6 @@ sub GenerateFiles
+ 		HAVE_ATOMICS               => 1,
+ 		HAVE_ATOMIC_H              => undef,
+ 		HAVE_BACKTRACE_SYMBOLS     => undef,
+-		HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA          => undef,
+ 		HAVE_BIO_METH_NEW          => undef,
+ 		HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME         => undef,
+ 		HAVE_COMPUTED_GOTO         => undef,
+@@ -566,7 +565,6 @@ sub GenerateFiles
+ 			|| ($digit1 >= '1' && $digit2 >= '1' && $digit3 >= '0'))
+ 		{
+ 			$define{HAVE_ASN1_STRING_GET0_DATA} = 1;
+-			$define{HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA}          = 1;
+ 			$define{HAVE_BIO_METH_NEW}          = 1;
+ 			$define{HAVE_HMAC_CTX_FREE}         = 1;
+ 			$define{HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW}          = 1;
+commit 551d4b28e4453fce5890c0df7121bae44b417ec2
+Author: Tom Lane <tgl at sss.pgh.pa.us>
+Date:   Mon Dec 11 11:51:56 2023 -0500
+
+    Be more wary about OpenSSL not setting errno on error.
+    
+    OpenSSL will sometimes return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL without having set
+    errno; this is apparently a reflection of recv(2)'s habit of not
+    setting errno when reporting EOF.  Ensure that we treat such cases
+    the same as read EOF.  Previously, we'd frequently report them like
+    "could not accept SSL connection: Success" which is confusing, or
+    worse report them with an unrelated errno left over from some
+    previous syscall.
+    
+    To fix, ensure that errno is zeroed immediately before the call,
+    and report its value only when it's not zero afterwards; otherwise
+    report EOF.
+    
+    For consistency, I've applied the same coding pattern in libpq's
+    pqsecure_raw_read().  Bare recv(2) shouldn't really return -1 without
+    setting errno, but in case it does we might as well cope.
+    
+    Per report from Andres Freund.  Back-patch to all supported versions.
+    
+    Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20231208181451.deqnflwxqoehhxpe@awork3.anarazel.de
+
+diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+index aed8a75345..ed13e8b06d 100644
+--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
++++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+@@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ aloop:
+ 	 * per-thread error queue following another call to an OpenSSL I/O
+ 	 * routine.
+ 	 */
++	errno = 0;
+ 	ERR_clear_error();
+ 	r = SSL_accept(port->ssl);
+ 	if (r <= 0)
+@@ -493,7 +494,7 @@ aloop:
+ 										 WAIT_EVENT_SSL_OPEN_SERVER);
+ 				goto aloop;
+ 			case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+-				if (r < 0)
++				if (r < 0 && errno != 0)
+ 					ereport(COMMERROR,
+ 							(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+ 							 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %m")));
+@@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+ 			break;
+ 		case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ 			/* leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno */
+-			if (n != -1)
++			if (n != -1 || errno == 0)
+ 			{
+ 				errno = ECONNRESET;
+ 				n = -1;
+@@ -785,8 +786,14 @@ be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+ 			n = -1;
+ 			break;
+ 		case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+-			/* leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno */
+-			if (n != -1)
++
++			/*
++			 * Leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno.  However, if
++			 * errno is still zero then assume it's a read EOF situation, and
++			 * report ECONNRESET.  (This seems possible because SSL_write can
++			 * also do reads.)
++			 */
++			if (n != -1 || errno == 0)
+ 			{
+ 				errno = ECONNRESET;
+ 				n = -1;
+diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
+index 75392a8bb7..bb9fa77cd4 100644
+--- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
++++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
+@@ -954,6 +954,8 @@ pq_recvbuf(void)
+ 	{
+ 		int			r;
+ 
++		errno = 0;
++
+ 		r = secure_read(MyProcPort, PqRecvBuffer + PqRecvLength,
+ 						PQ_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - PqRecvLength);
+ 
+@@ -966,10 +968,13 @@ pq_recvbuf(void)
+ 			 * Careful: an ereport() that tries to write to the client would
+ 			 * cause recursion to here, leading to stack overflow and core
+ 			 * dump!  This message must go *only* to the postmaster log.
++			 *
++			 * If errno is zero, assume it's EOF and let the caller complain.
+ 			 */
+-			ereport(COMMERROR,
+-					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+-					 errmsg("could not receive data from client: %m")));
++			if (errno != 0)
++				ereport(COMMERROR,
++						(errcode_for_socket_access(),
++						 errmsg("could not receive data from client: %m")));
+ 			return EOF;
+ 		}
+ 		if (r == 0)
+@@ -1046,6 +1051,8 @@ pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c)
+ 	/* Put the socket into non-blocking mode */
+ 	socket_set_nonblocking(true);
+ 
++	errno = 0;
++
+ 	r = secure_read(MyProcPort, c, 1);
+ 	if (r < 0)
+ 	{
+@@ -1062,10 +1069,13 @@ pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c)
+ 			 * Careful: an ereport() that tries to write to the client would
+ 			 * cause recursion to here, leading to stack overflow and core
+ 			 * dump!  This message must go *only* to the postmaster log.
++			 *
++			 * If errno is zero, assume it's EOF and let the caller complain.
+ 			 */
+-			ereport(COMMERROR,
+-					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+-					 errmsg("could not receive data from client: %m")));
++			if (errno != 0)
++				ereport(COMMERROR,
++						(errcode_for_socket_access(),
++						 errmsg("could not receive data from client: %m")));
+ 			r = EOF;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+index d863d279a0..61f37678a6 100644
+--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ rloop:
+ 			 */
+ 			goto rloop;
+ 		case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+-			if (n < 0)
++			if (n < 0 && SOCK_ERRNO != 0)
+ 			{
+ 				result_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
+ 				if (result_errno == EPIPE ||
+@@ -317,7 +317,13 @@ pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+ 			n = 0;
+ 			break;
+ 		case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+-			if (n < 0)
++
++			/*
++			 * If errno is still zero then assume it's a read EOF situation,
++			 * and report EOF.  (This seems possible because SSL_write can
++			 * also do reads.)
++			 */
++			if (n < 0 && SOCK_ERRNO != 0)
+ 			{
+ 				result_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
+ 				if (result_errno == EPIPE || result_errno == ECONNRESET)
+@@ -1479,10 +1485,12 @@ open_client_SSL(PGconn *conn)
+ {
+ 	int			r;
+ 
++	SOCK_ERRNO_SET(0);
+ 	ERR_clear_error();
+ 	r = SSL_connect(conn->ssl);
+ 	if (r <= 0)
+ 	{
++		int			save_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
+ 		int			err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, r);
+ 		unsigned long ecode;
+ 
+@@ -1499,10 +1507,10 @@ open_client_SSL(PGconn *conn)
+ 				{
+ 					char		sebuf[PG_STRERROR_R_BUFLEN];
+ 
+-					if (r == -1)
++					if (r == -1 && save_errno != 0)
+ 						appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ 										  libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: %s\n"),
+-										  SOCK_STRERROR(SOCK_ERRNO, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
++										  SOCK_STRERROR(save_errno, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
+ 					else
+ 						appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
+ 											 libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: EOF detected\n"));
+diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+index a1dc7b796d..4c85b7299c 100644
+--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ pqsecure_raw_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+ 	int			result_errno = 0;
+ 	char		sebuf[PG_STRERROR_R_BUFLEN];
+ 
++	SOCK_ERRNO_SET(0);
++
+ 	n = recv(conn->sock, ptr, len, 0);
+ 
+ 	if (n < 0)
+@@ -262,6 +264,11 @@ pqsecure_raw_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+ 												   "\tbefore or while processing the request.\n"));
+ 				break;
+ 
++			case 0:
++				/* If errno didn't get set, treat it as regular EOF */
++				n = 0;
++				break;
++
+ 			default:
+ 				appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ 								  libpq_gettext("could not receive data from server: %s\n"),
================================================================

---- gitweb:

http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/postgresql.git/commitdiff/d1be35eddc349bc8703fb42b72375d4a7701750a



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