Stack Smashing Protection - are we obsolete?

[Elan Ruusamäe]

On 18.09.2015 22:57, Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz wrote:
> On Friday 18 of September 2015, Tomasz Pala wrote:
>> I've been searching this for an hour now but can't find any discussion on
>> this - why do we have (rpm/macros.pld.in)
>>
>> %_ssp_cflags	-fstack-protector --param=ssp-buffer-size=4
>>
>> instead superior -fstack-protector-strong which seems to be taken as
>> default in many distros, even on gcc level?
> Looks like our version was used by distros back then... I have no problems
> with switching to -fstack-protector-strong.
>
> http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTM5NjQ
>
> http://outflux.net/blog/archives/2014/01/27/fstack-protector-strong/
>
> https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening
> "Prior to GCC 4.9, `-fstack-protector --param ssp-buffer-size=4' is used to
> cover functions that defines a 4 or more byte local character array, which is
> an okay balance for security and performance. For those who want to protect
> all the functions then -fstack-protector-all is recommended.
>
> Since GCC 4.9, -fstack-protector-strong, an improved version of -fstack-
> protector is introduced, which covers all the more paranoid conditions that
> might lead to a stack overflow but not trade performance like -fstack-
> protector-all, thus it becomes default."

your commit
http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/rpm.git/commitdiff/f5f4004c4c8eeb0f338fa3e53b9a82c18faa0add

should include updated gcc version dependency too?


-- 
glen